The End of History and the Return of Geopolitics
Francis Fukuyama’s optimistic theory of the “End of History” now reads as a cautionary tale, as we reach the limits of the neoliberal democratic order and face the resurgence of geopolitics in an increasingly unstable multipolar world.
In his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama put forward one of the most provocative and enduring hypotheses in international relations. It was a paradox—naively optimistic in the face of the realist tradition shaped by three major wars in the 20th century—yet strikingly sharp. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Western liberal democratic order seemed to herald a natural “long peace” after humanity’s most violent chapters.
This “end of accumulated chaos” after the Cold War brought with it a new certainty: the belief in the end of human conflict. But it also planted the seeds for its return.
For Fukuyama’s proponents, this unipolar moment offered a vision of linear progress rooted in a triangle of democracy, trade, and economic interdependence. Others, however, saw it as a reminder of our entrapment in history and a prelude to the eventual collapse of the current global order. Yet history’s return does not imply a simple repetition. While optimistic theories denied the emergence of new threats, pessimistic perspectives pointed toward a phase reminiscent of interwar Europe.
What is now termed the “return of power politics” is not a German-style confrontation, but rather a departure from the U.S.-led Western status quo. The post-WWII international order is now barely recognizable, challenged by the rise of new powers, the shift of wealth and influence from West to East, intensifying globalization, transnational forces, and a convergence of differences between states.
The Failure of the “End of History” Hypothesis
The downfall of Fukuyama’s theory stems from two core assumptions:
- The inevitable global adoption of democracy.
- The universal acceptance of liberalism as a moral framework for humanity.
The Failure of the Democratic Model
For Fukuyama’s thesis to hold, democracy and liberalism needed to spread worldwide. That convergence never happened. Some countries, like China, adopted elements of economic liberalism without embracing democratic governance—proving that the link between the two is neither natural nor inevitable.
Even where liberal democracy did spread, it didn’t always prove superior. In recent decades, some authoritarian regimes have outperformed democracies in economic development, social cohesion, and crisis management—challenging the assumption that liberal democracy is the most effective or desirable model. This was especially evident during social crises; for instance, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed that some authoritarian regimes were better positioned to implement decisive, effective emergency measures.
As transnational crises escalate—climate change, resource competition, pandemics, cyber threats, migration—adaptability and resilience may outweigh the political system type.
The Collapse of the Liberal Ideal
The theory assumed a universal ethical framework for good and evil. Liberal democracy, it claimed, ensured peace: “democracies don’t fight each other.” But evidence shows democracies frequently engage in conflict with non-democratic states. U.S. interventions in Iraq, Kuwait, and elsewhere suggest democracy doesn’t guarantee peace. Unless all states become democracies, the conditions to prevent war remain unmet.
The idea of a universal “political morality” overlooks the fact that governance is shaped by local contexts, trade-offs, and power struggles unique to each society. Politics free of conflict or power is as unrealistic as a world unified by a single religion or moral code.
The Decline of the Western Neoliberal Democratic Order
Attempts to export democracy and pursue regime change in authoritarian states often fueled nationalism and resentment of Western interference. U.S. invasions of Iraq (2003) and NATO’s intervention in Libya (2011), though framed as democratization efforts, destabilized regions and intensified anti-Western sentiment. They also strengthened claims for national sovereignty. Russia and China now champion non-interference and sovereignty. Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2014) and the rise of global nationalist movements reflect this rejection of external intervention.
Simultaneously, transnational institutions—once pillars of peace—have weakened. Their legitimacy is being challenged by the rise of the Global South. These institutions, while expanding membership, have lost their effectiveness in resolving conflict. In the Global North, their growing authority over national governments has fueled political unrest, as seen in the EU. This has revitalized nationalism and sovereignty as central political values.
The radicalization of political systems, rising extremism, and increasing political instability are fracturing the global order. Right- and left-wing populism complicates both domestic stability and international cooperation.
Economic and Strategic Dimensions
Economically, while global wealth continues to grow, hyper-globalization has weakened economic stability in liberal states. As capital flows to the Asia-Pacific and supply chains break down, Western economies face rising unemployment, growing inequality, and a shrinking middle class—fueling internal discontent and backlash against globalization.
Strategically, liberal ideals of a borderless, interconnected world have reshaped distance and space in international affairs. Where distance once prevented conflict, globalization has “shrunk” the world, making borders, people, and ideas more interconnected—and vulnerable. This interconnectedness has exposed new internal and external threats. As national sovereignty and identity push back against progressive neoliberal ideals, borders and independence have reemerged as key flashpoints.
The Breakdown of Traditional Security Frameworks
Security frameworks have eroded. Traditional alliances like NATO and the UN are being replaced by pragmatic partnerships and strategic hedging, reflecting a deepening distrust in legacy systems. Meanwhile, nuclear arms races have returned, with China and Russia advancing vertical proliferation strategies—often in opaque ways. New technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and advanced missile defense systems, are undermining transparency and deterrence. What once seemed stable now signals volatility and fragmentation.
The Clash of Civilizations Revisited
These dynamics echo Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations.” Ideological and structural divides are deepening—North vs. South, West vs. East, center vs. periphery. Migration, climate change, and economic inequality are reinforcing cultural and geopolitical fault lines. Instead of uniting humanity under a global cosmopolitan order, globalization is fracturing civilizations further.
The Collapse of the Western International Order
Foundations once thought to ensure peace and progress are crumbling under their contradictions. These overlapping crises represent not only the decline of the post-Cold War neoliberal order but the emergence of a new geopolitical paradigm—one shaped by the intersection of geography (climate change, resource scarcity, environmental degradation) and politics (demographic shifts, democratic retreat, renewed conflict). The result is a world more conflict-prone, multipolar, and unstable.
The Failure of Western Neoliberal Ideology
Western-promoted ideologies appear increasingly outdated in the face of systemic change.
The U.S.-led “pause” in history allowed for theories that emphasized international society’s social and ideological dimensions—its identities, structures, and meanings. But the absence of war was mistaken for peace. The long period without great-power conflict fed the illusion that global resources and interests could be managed like chess pieces. Post-WWII peace was built on a hopeful belief that new rules could prevent humanity’s violent past—a belief now unraveling.
A New Challenge Demands a Rethinking
Just as international relations theory failed to predict the Soviet collapse, it now faces another transformative moment. To avoid another analytical failure, the field must urgently rethink its assumptions.
This is a call to abandon the illusion of permanent peace and recognize that history’s return may well lead to another “end of history”—if we fail to recover the essence of politics and adapt to the return of multipolar geopolitics. International relations must relearn how to study and practice politics—not by assuming a single future, but by navigating multiple possible futures.
A Practical and Flexible Logic
Imagine a world where China can mediate cooperation between ideological rivals like Iran and Saudi Arabia—while partnering with its adversaries. Modern international relations increasingly follow a pragmatic, reciprocal logic driven by strategic interests. Former enemies now forge new partnerships where interests outweigh ideology, and strategy eclipses values.
The Rising Geopolitical Landscape
With Huntington’s vision of global democracy fading, and war returning to Europe and the Middle East, strategic regions—Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, the Arctic, and maritime chokepoints like Malacca and Panama—are becoming flashpoints for future crises. These developments expose the irrelevance of the “End of History” thesis and confirm the urgent need for new theoretical frameworks. The transition—possibly through war—is no longer a matter of “if,” but “when.” Fukuyama’s failure reveals that peace is often circumstantial—a fragile pause in the ongoing cycle of violence that defines international relations.
Conclusion
Just as conditions for peace can create the conditions for war, and just as the illusion of history’s end paved the way for its return, we must break free from the trap of swinging between peace and conflict. Churchill’s warning that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it misses a deeper truth: humanity may be doomed to repeat history regardless of whether it learns.
Learning alone is not enough. Only proactive theory and a dynamic, context-sensitive understanding can meaningfully intervene in the complex forces shaping global order. International relations cannot escape history—but it must transcend the triumphant hubris of the post-WWII order and focus on the next 50–75 years of upheaval, emergence, and realignment. If it is to remain politically relevant, international relations must help us confront multiple possible futures—not merely assume one.
Raphaël B.B. Dawson
A doctoral candidate in political science at Panthéon-Sorbonne University in Paris. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Groningen and a bachelor’s in political science from Concordia University. His research focuses on international security, Southeast Asian studies, great power competition, and nuclear strategy. He previously worked as a research assistant at the Partnership for Global Security (PGS) in Washington, D.C., and at the Graduate Studies Division of the French Military School (DEMS).