Why the Houthis Won’t Collapse Even If Iran Falls
The Houthis will not collapse even if Iran’s regime falls. They are deeply rooted in Yemen’s Zaydi political tradition, possess an expanding domestic weapons production capability, and benefit not only from Iranian arms smuggling but also from growing Chinese support — including guidance systems and supplies funneled through Djibouti to Yemeni ports.
U.S. strikes stopped in the spring of 2025 following limited Houthi assurances, leaving broader shipping lanes and Israeli targets exposed.
Relying on Tehran’s collapse is a mistake akin to the miscalculations of the 1990s regarding North Korea. Even after Iran’s fall, Beijing may continue supporting the Houthis to pressure the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and Western supply chains.
Political Implication: Yemen must be viewed as part of the China problem, and policy should be adjusted accordingly.
China’s Quiet Lifeline to the Houthis in Yemen
The Houthis are not a creation of the Islamic Republic. They are a tribal Zaydi group that arose in Yemen from genuine grievances, aggravated by the misconduct of the northern Yemeni elite.
When the Houthis rebelled, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) saw an opportunity to co-opt them into the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
With Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s regime faltering, many U.S. and regional policymakers hope that the Houthis will lose their grip on Yemen if Iran falls. Superficially, optimists might cite Syria’s case, where the IRGC scaled back support for the Assad family amid wartime strain and refrained from sending more forces to Damascus.
After Houthi attacks on U.S. vessels in the Red Sea, President Donald Trump ordered American forces to strike Houthi positions from March 15 to May 6, 2025, then announced a unilateral ceasefire in exchange for the Houthis halting direct attacks on U.S. interests.
The Houthis may still target other ships and launch drones at Israel, but from the White House’s perspective, such actions are “someone else’s problem,” not an immediate American responsibility.
The North Korea Analogy
There is a degree of wishful thinking in the White House and intelligence community that the Houthis are living on “borrowed time” as the Axis of Resistance weakens. This mirrors the Clinton administration’s mistaken assumptions about North Korea.
As global communism collapsed, President Bill Clinton wrongly assumed Pyongyang’s collapse was inevitable — a belief shared by Secretary of State Warren Christopher — shaping Washington’s approach to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Consequently, the U.S. failed to apply sufficient pressure to prevent North Korea’s path toward nuclear weapons.
A Historical Perspective
It would be foolish to adopt a passive policy assuming that the end of the Islamic Republic would automatically end the Houthi movement. This misunderstands Yemen’s history.
Zaydis have deep roots in Yemen. Many Yemenis see the Houthis as a continuation of the Imamate that ruled the country from the late 16th to mid-19th century, then again after a brief Ottoman interlude and into the early 20th century under Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din. Egypt supported Arab nationalists who overthrew the Imamate in 1962.
The Iran Factor
Iran continues to back the Houthis, who maintain an embassy in Tehran and host a small number of IRGC trainers — far fewer than Iran deployed in Lebanon or Iraq. The IRGC also continues smuggling advanced weapons to the Houthis via dhows from Djibouti to Yemen’s poorly inspected port of Hodeidah, and through tribal smuggling routes from Oman across al-Mahra and Hadramaut provinces.
Still, much of the Houthis’ current capability now relies on local production. As in Syria, Russia, and Tajikistan, Iran has exported not just drones and missiles but also the know-how to manufacture them.
The Houthis also appear to have obtained advanced missile guidance systems from China. Many of their anti-ship missiles are Chinese clones, easily sourced from Chinese suppliers. Some of these shipments have been tracked being transferred ship-to-ship and unloaded at Yemeni ports.
China’s presence in Djibouti facilitates these arms transfers, reviving the country’s historic role as a smuggling hub. Once missile components, munitions, and chemicals are loaded onto small dhows or fishing boats, they become difficult to trace.
Chinese Assistance in Targeting
In April 2025, evidence surfaced that Chinese firms were assisting the Houthis in targeting U.S. vessels. While U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby urges focus on China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing is adopting a broader strategy — disrupting U.S. and European supply chains via the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Even after Khamenei’s death and the fall of the Islamic Republic, China is expected to continue supporting the Houthis as its proxy in the Arabian Peninsula.
Conclusion and Warning
Washington’s wishful thinking — that humanitarian instincts will replace geopolitical interests once Iran’s patronage ends — is misguided.
Turkey filled the vacuum in Syria. Iran seeks a return in southern Lebanon. Its ties to Iraqi militias remain strong. In Yemen, China is positioning itself to uphold the status quo after Iran’s collapse.
Believing that the United States can ignore Yemen to focus solely on China reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of both Yemeni realities and China’s grand strategy — and neglecting this will ultimately cost American lives.
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Director of Policy Analysis at the Middle East Forum.